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MARKETS AFTER CREDIT SUISSE
SECURITIES (USA) LLC V. BILLING
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INTRODUCTION

For over a century, American antitrust laws have sought to
promote competitive conduct in the market place and to protect
consumers from price discrimination, price fixing, and other ill
effects of monopolistic behavior.1 The application of antitrust
laws to industries subject to federal regulation presents a
difficult issue, since an activity otherwise prohibited by the
antitrust laws may be permitted or even required when Congress
has spoken by passing a regulatory statute. 2 A court must
determine whether a regulatory statute-either expressly or by
implication-repeals the antitrust laws, and whether jurisdiction
over the particular conduct lies with the regulatory agency,

t J.D. Candidate, June 2009, St. John's University School of Law; M.F.A., 2004,
University of Massachusetts; B.A., 2001, University of Houston. The author would
like to thank Professor Francis J. Facciolo for his valuable help and guidance, and
Kate Allen and his parents for all their support.
1 Burton D. Garland, Jr. & Reuven R. Levary, The Role of American Antitrust
Laws in Today's Competitive Global Marketplace, 6 U. MIAMI Bus. L.J. 43, 43 (1997)
(stating that the twin goals of American antitrust law are "the promotion of
competitive conduct and consumer welfare"); see also United States v. Topco Assocs.,
405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) ("[T]he Sherman Act... [is] the Magna Carta of free
enterprise."); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972) ("Every
violation of the antitrust laws is a blow to the free-enterprise system envisaged by
Congress.... This system depends on strong competition for its health and vigor,
and strong competition depends, in turn, on compliance with antitrust legislation.").
2 1 JULIAN 0. VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE
REGULATION § 60.01 (2d ed. 2007) (quoting Ricci v. Chi. Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S.
289, 299 (1973)); see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY
§ 19.3b (3d ed. 2005) (stating that traditionally, regulated markets have been viewed
as a "closed box," where antitrust enforcement is "generally unwelcome or at least
seriously confined").
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rather than the court.3 When Congress has remained silent, a
court may determine that implied immunity exists if maintaining
an antitrust action would "thwart the regulatory scheme created
by Congress." 4 Although both securities regulation and antitrust
laws seek to promote efficient markets, 5 the SEC, in regulating
securities markets, must consider additional issues, such as "the
economic health of the investors, the exchanges, and the
securities industry," unlike antitrust law, which is concerned
solely with competition. 6 The parallel application of antitrust
laws and securities regulation could therefore potentially
interfere with regulatory controls and "could undercut the very
objectives the antitrust laws are designed to serve. ' 7 The
Securities Act, the Securities Exchange Act, and the Investment
Company Act,8 like most regulatory statutes, are silent on the

3

See KALINOWSKI ET AL., supra note 2, § 60.02.

4 Id. The doctrine of implied immunity or "implied repeal" is derived from two

Supreme Court cases, Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204
U.S. 426 (1907), and Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., 260 U.S. 156
(1922). In Abilene, a non-antitrust case, the plaintiff had brought an action to
recover damages caused by a common carrier's collection of an allegedly
unreasonable rate. The defendant argued that it was exempt from liability, because
the rate it charged had been approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission
("ICC"). KALINOWSKI ET AL., supra note 2, § 60.02 & nn.1-3. The Supreme Court
held that it would conflict with the regulatory scheme granted to the ICC to permit a
state court to hear the plaintiffs claim, and the plaintiff was required to seek
redress through the ICC. See Abilene, 204 U.S. at 440-41, 448. Keogh "was the first
case in which the Supreme Court dismissed an antitrust claim because the industry
was regulated." In Keogh, the plaintiff, a shipper, brought an antitrust action
alleging a price-fixing conspiracy by an association. The association's defense was
that the rates had been approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Since
the Interstate Commerce Act did not expressly provide for antitrust immunity for
rates approved by the ICC, the Court found immunity by implication. KALINOWSKI
ET AL., supra note 2, § 60.02 n.3.
5 See Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1990).
6 Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 689 (1975); see also Herbert
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Violations in Securities Markets, 28 J. CORP. L. 607, 609
(2003) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Antitrust Violations] ("For the SEC these various
goals may sometimes be in conflict and must be balanced against each other. By
contrast, antitrust is myopic .... ").
7 Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 22.
8 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(a), 78bb(a), 80a-49 (2000).
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issue of antitrust jurisdiction, 9 leaving courts to determine
whether implied immunity exists.' 0
While the Supreme Court has stated that the general
principles
applicable to antitrust immunity are "well
established,"1 1 commentators have opined that "'[tjhe case law of
implied immunity is... a quagmire.'"12 Courts have differed
greatly on when implied immunity is necessary. 13 Despite this
confusion, courts have developed two distinct approaches,
treating implied immunity largely as a question of authority.
Most courts have looked at whether the challenged conduct fell
under the jurisdiction of the regulatory agency.14
If the
challenged practice fell under the agency's jurisdiction, and the
agency has exercised its authority over the practice, then a
finding of implied immunity may be appropriate. Courts have
differed, though, as to the extent to which the agency must
exercise its authority over the practice in question before finding
implied immunity.1 5 A second approach is to base a finding of
9 See, e.g., Gordon, 422 U.S. at 687 (noting that the Exchange Act "did not
confer a general antitrust immunity"). Other regulatory statutes, however, such as
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, contain a savings clause stating that nothing
in the statute affects the applicability of antitrust laws. See 47 U.S.C. § 152 n.(b)(1)
(2000).
10 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, § 19.3a.
11 Nat'l Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Ctr. v. Blue Cross of Kan. City, 452
U.S. 378, 388 (1981).
12 John Kern, Comment, Price Manipulationin the Commodity Futures Market:
A Reexamination of the Justificationsfor Simultaneous Causes of Action Under the
CEA and the Sherman Act, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1305, 1318 (1987) (quoting Jerome
Shuman, The Application of the Antitrust Laws to Regulated Industries, 44 TENN. L.
REV. 1, 27 (1976)); see also Phonetele, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 664 F.2d 716, 727
(9th Cir. 1981) ("[W]e must recognize there is no simplistic and mechanically
universal doctrine of implied antitrust immunity."); 1A PHILLIP E. AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 243c (3d ed. 2006) ("The implied immunity
cases resist definitive harmonization.").
13 See James M. Falvey & Andrew N. Kleit, Commodity Exchanges and
Antitrust, 4 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 123, 155 (2007) ("To say that the implied
repeal ... cases lack adequate guidelines and/or a satisfactory standard to follow in
future cases is an understatement.").
14 Gordon, 422 U.S. at 685 (finding implied immunity when the challenged
conduct fell under the SEC's jurisdiction); cf. Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S.
341, 357 (1963) (finding that implied immunity was not applicable when conduct did
not fall under SEC's jurisdiction), superseded by statute, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78c(f),
78w(a)(2) (West 2006).
15 See United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 729-30 (1975)
(finding implied immunity though SEC had not exercised its authority over the
conduct in question); see also Miller v. Am. Stock Exch., Inc. (In re Stock Exchs.
Options Trading Antitrust Litig.), 317 F.3d 134, 149 (2d Cir. 2003); cf. Gordon, 422
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implied immunity solely on the presence of a pervasive
Courts have found implied immunity
regulatory scheme.
appropriate when the agency controls every aspect of the
industry's conduct, 16 or when "'Congress must be assumed to
have foresworn the paradigm of competition'" in creating the
regulatory scheme. 17 Implied immunity, however, has rarely
been established solely on the presence of pervasive regulation. 18
Steady throughout these differing approaches to implied
immunity in the case law is the long-held standard that, for
implied immunity to apply, there must be "'a convincing showing
of clear repugnancy between the anti-trust laws and the
regulatory system.' "19 Most courts have held that a repugnancy
exists when the application of both antitrust laws and the
regulatory scheme would produce conflicting standards for the
21
regulated industry. 20 Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc.
U.S. at 685, 689-90 (finding implied immunity based on active role of the SEC);
Silver, 373 U.S. at 357-58 (refusing to find immunity when there is nothing in the
regulatory scheme to perform the antitrust function); Am. Agric. Movement, Inc. v.
Bd. of Trade, 977 F.2d 1147, 1167 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that implied immunity is
only appropriate when agency "approval of the challenged practice is active,
intrusive and appropriately deliberative"); Sound, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 631
F.2d 1324, 1330 (8th Cir. 1980) (finding no implied immunity when the FCC did not
exercise its authority). Gordon has been criticized for failing to establish whether
immunity may be implied when an agency does not exercise its authority over the
activity. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12,
243d; Kern, supra note 12, at
1320.
16 See Am. Agric. Movement, 977 F.2d at 1158.
17 MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1102 (7th Cir.
1983) (quoting Ne. Tel. Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 82 (2d Cir. 1981)); see
also NASD, 422 U.S. at 732-33 ("[T]he investiture of such pervasive supervisory
authority in the SEC suggests that Congress intended to lift the ban of the Sherman
Act from association activities approved by the SEC."); Otter Tail Power Co. v.
United States, 410 U.S. 366, 373-75 (1973); Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363, 389 (1973); United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S.
321, 352 (1963) (holding that federal regulation of banking was not so
comprehensive as to preclude antitrust laws).
18 C. DOUGLAS FLOYD & E. THOMAS SULLIVAN, PRIVATE ANTITRUST ACTIONS
§ 3.4.4.2 (1996); see also MCI, 708 F.2d at 1103 (holding that implied immunity is
not established by the mere pervasiveness of a regulatory scheme); Ne. Tel. Co., 651
F.2d at 82-83; HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, § 19.3b ("[T]he pervasiveness of the
general regulatory regime is relatively unimportant.").
19 Nat'l Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Ctr. v. Blue Cross of Kan. City, 452
U.S. 378, 388 (1981) (quoting NASD, 422 U.S. at 719-20); accord Gordon, 422 U.S.
at 682; Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 350-51; Phonetele, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.,
664 F.2d 716, 726 (9th Cir. 1981); Sound, 631 F.2d at 1327; MCI Commc'ns Corp. v.
Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 462 F. Supp. 1072, 1083 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (referring to
"repugnancy" as a "threshold requirement" for a finding of implied immunity).
20 Strobl v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 768 F.2d 22, 27 (2d Cir. 1985) ("[A]ntitrust
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provides a clear example of this traditional implied immunity
analysis. In Gordon, the SEC had approved a system of fixed
commission rates, a practice that would be a per se violation of
antitrust laws. Since the practice fell under the SEC's authority
and there was a direct conflict between the two laws, the
Supreme Court found implied immunity. 22 Other courts have
also viewed repugnancy, not in terms of a conflict between two
laws, but as a conflict of authority: Application of antitrust laws
would conflict with the authority Congress has granted to
23
regulatory agencies.
Still, courts have applied even this seemingly simple rule in
different ways. Courts have differed as to the effect agency
approval or disapproval of the activity has on the question of
implied immunity. Some courts have been willing to find implied
immunity even when the challenged conduct has been
disapproved of by both antitrust laws and the regulatory
agency. 24 Many courts, however, have chosen to treat agency
disapproval of the challenged practice as refuting any claim of
implied immunity since, in such cases, there would be no conflict
between antitrust laws and the regulatory scheme. 25 In short,
the "clear repugnancy" standard appears as muddled as the other
areas of implied immunity case law.
Two recent Supreme Court cases have addressed the issue of
implied antitrust immunity for regulated industries. Instead of
laws may not apply when such laws would prohibit an action that a regulatory
scheme might allow."); see also Finnegan v. Campeau Corp., 915 F.2d 824, 829 (2d

Cir. 1990) (holding that implied immunity "may only be found where there is a
conflict between the provisions of the antitrust and securities laws").
21 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
22 Id. at 689.
23 See, e.g., Miller v. Am. Stock Exch., Inc. (In re Stock Exchs. Options Trading
Antitrust Litig.), 317 F.3d 134, 149 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[Ilmplied repeal does not turn on
whether the antitrust laws conflict with the current view of the regulatory agency;
rather it turns on whether the antitrust laws conflict with an overall regulatory
scheme...."); Friedman v. Salomon/Smith Barney, Inc., 313 F.3d 796, 800-01 (2d
Cir. 2002) (holding that implied immunity exists when antitrust laws would "conflict
with Congress's implicit determination that the SEC should regulate the alleged
anti-competitive conduct"); see also Jeffrey R. Babbin et al., Developments in the
Second Circuit: 2002-2003, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1187, 1234-35 (2004) (arguing that
Stock Exchanges Options equates "repugnancy" with the Silver "necessity"
standard).
24 See Stock Exchs. Options, 317 F.3d at 149.
25 See Strobl, 768 F.2d at 28; MCI Commc'ns. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708
F.2d 1081, 1105 (7th Cir. 1983); Phonetele, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 664 F.2d 716,
732 (9th Cir. 1981).
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providing a much-needed definite standard, however, these cases,
by shifting the Court's focus to a more outcome-determinative
analysis, have only produced additional questions. In Verizon
26
Communications, Inc. v. Law Office of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,
the Court suggested that implied immunity for violations of the
Sherman Act may be appropriate when there is a real possibility
that antitrust courts will produce judgments that conflict with
the FCC's regulatory scheme.2 7 The Court, upon finding that
implied immunity was not appropriate, proceeded to apply a
"costs-benefits" analysis, maintaining that, where a strong
regulatory agency is in place, the benefits of additional antitrust
enforcement are slight and, thus, unnecessary. 28
Trinko is
significant; unlike previous immunity analysis, which was
largely concerned with whether authority over the challenged
conduct fell to the agency or antitrust laws, Trinko is largely
concerned with outcome (i.e., the potential effects of withholding
29
antitrust immunity).
Three years later, in Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v.
Billing,30 the Court considered the issue of whether there was a
clear repugnancy between antitrust and securities laws. 31
Although both the regulatory scheme and antitrust laws
prohibited the activity in question, the Court still found a conflict
between securities and antitrust laws. In determining whether
the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act were "irreconcilable" with
the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, the Court did not adopt
the same analysis as prior implied immunity cases, by examining
whether the two sets of laws were in conflict. Rather, the Court
looked chiefly at the potential difficulties for judges and juries in
resolving such issues, as opposed to the SEC, 32 and applied a
cost-benefit analysis for antitrust enforcement (echoing Trinko).33
The Court pointed to the danger of conflicting standards-both a

26 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
27 Id.
at 406; see also Falvey & Kleit, supra note 13 (arguing that Trinko
"reinforces the Strobl antitrust laws and regulatory scheme 'conflict' standard of
reviewing").
28 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 412-13.

29 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, at

243g.

127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007).
31 Id. at 2393 ("[The question before us concerns ....[whether] there [is] a
conflict that rises to the level of incompatibility.").
32 Id. at 2394-96.
33 Id. at 2396.
30

UNCLEAR REPUGNANCY

2008]

1121

conflict between courts and the SEC as well as the possibility of
different courts providing a variety of different standards for the
industry. 34 In light of this new approach to implied immunity
analysis, the standard for determining when a repugnancy exists
is still anything but clear.
This Note argues that a "clear repugnancy" does not exist
when both the SEC and antitrust laws prohibit the activity in
question. In reaching its finding of implied immunity, Billing
departed from the principles of traditional immunity analysis to
create a new, outcome-determinative test for repugnancy. This
approach-that a repugnancy exists when there is the potential
for conflicting outcomes from lower courts-is an unprecedented
broadening of the implied immunity doctrine. Part I of this Note
examines courts' divergent approaches to the "clear repugnancy"
standard in implied immunity cases concerning the securities
industry prior to Billing. Part II of this Note analyzes Billing
and the Court's approach to the "clear repugnancy" standard.
Part III of this Note proposes that SEC approval of the
challenged conduct is essential to a finding of "clear repugnancy"
and that, for a conflict to exist, the two laws must produce
"differing results."
I.

HISTORY OF IMPLIED IMMUNITY IN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY

A.

The Supreme Court Cases: Silver-Gordon-NASD
Three Supreme Court cases established certain basic factors
for a finding of implied immunity in the securities markets.
First, there must be a clear repugnancy between securities laws
and antitrust laws. A repugnancy is present when the SEC has
been granted authority over the activity and exercised that
authority, and when the application of both laws would result in
35
conflicting standards for the industry.
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of implied
antitrust immunity in the securities industry in Silver v. New
York Stock Exchange.3 6 In Silver, a securities firm that was not a
member of the New York Stock Exchange arranged to have direct
34

Id. at 2395.

See id. at 2392 (discussing the factors required for antitrust immunity as
derived from Gordon and NASD).
36 373 U.S. 341 (1963), superseded by statute, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78c(f), 78w(a)(2)
(West 2006).
35
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telephone wire connections to Exchange members, in order to
have greater access to market data. 37 The Exchange originally
approved of the connections but later rescinded its decision and
cut off the connections to Exchange members. 38 Silver brought
an action against the Exchange for violations of the Sherman
Act, arguing that the Exchange had engaged in anticompetitive
behavior resulting in substantial losses for Silver's firm. 39 Since
the removal of the wires by the Exchange would have constituted
a per se violation of antitrust laws, the Court had to determine
whether the Exchange Act had "created a duty of exchange selfregulation so pervasive as to" preclude the application of
antitrust laws, thus exempting the Exchange from liability in
this case. 40 The Court first noted that the Exchange Act provided
no express exemption from antitrust laws, and that immunity by
implication is "not favored" but may be found if immunity is
"necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work, and even
41
then only to the minimum extent necessary."
Once the Court noted that courts should reconcile antitrust
laws and regulatory schemes whenever possible, 42 the key issue
for the Court was whether Silver's antitrust suit was
43
"incompatible" with the SEC's regulation of the Exchange.
Since the Court found that the Exchange Act was not sufficiently
pervasive to create a total exemption from the Sherman Act and
the Clayton Act for the industry 44 and that the SEC did not have
authority under the Exchange Act to regulate the challenged
activity, there was no possibility of a conflict and, thus, implied
immunity was not appropriate. 45 Silver provided two factors in
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.

at
at
at
at

343.
344.
344-45.
347.

41 Id. at 357; see also Thill Sec. Corp. v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 433 F.2d 264, 269 (7th
Cir. 1970) (holding that implied immunity must be based on a showing of true
necessity). This is referred to as the Silver "'necessity' formula. See AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supranote 12, 243d.
42 See Silver, 373 U.S. at 357; see also United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S.
188, 198 (1939) (holding that when two laws touch upon the same subject, the rule is
to give effect to both laws if possible).
43 Silver, 373 U.S. at 358; see also Ricci v. Chi. Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289,
301 (1973) (discussing the Silver court's analysis of incompatibility between
regulatory statutes and antitrust laws).
44 See Silver, 373 U.S. at 360-61.
45 See id. at 357-58; see also Falvey & Kleit, supra note 13, at 150 ("Although
there was a comprehensive regulatory framework in place, there was no direct
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determining antitrust immunity: First, as a threshold issue,
there had to be a clear repugnancy (or "incompatibility" in the
language of Silver) between the regulatory scheme and antitrust
laws; and, second, immunity for the challenged conduct is
granted only to the minimum necessary to make the regulatory
46
scheme work (the Silver "necessity rule").
Twelve years later, the Court in Gordon v. New York Stock
Exchange, Inc.47 reexamined antitrust immunity in the securities
industry.
The plaintiff alleged that the Exchange's fixed
commission rates for stockbrokers, along with other practices,
violated the Sherman Act. 48 The Court employed a standard
similar to the "incompatibility" test used in Silver and stated
that an implied repeal could only be found where there is a
"'plain repugnancy between the antitrust and regulatory
provisions.' "49 Unlike the Silver Court, however, the Gordon
Court found a conflict between antitrust laws and the regulatory
scheme and granted implied immunity. 50 The Court based its
decision on the fact that the Exchange Act gave the SEC direct
regulatory power over the challenged activity and that the SEC
51
had taken an active role in regulating the activity.
Furthermore, to deny antitrust immunity would subject the
52
exchanges and their members to "conflicting standards."

securities regulation addressing the telephone issue found in Silver. Accordingly, the
Court denied the defense of Implied Immunity.").
46 Philip F. Johnson, Antitrust in the Commodities Field: After Gordon, 6
HOFSTRA L. REV. 115, 117 (1977).
47 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
48 See id. at 661. Gordon alleged that Exchange members had conspired to fix
commission rates for small investors at unreasonably high levels, in light of the
actual cost of executing a trade, and that this practice unlawfully discriminated
against small investors. See Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1261,
1262 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 498 F.2d 1303 (2d Cir. 1974), affld, 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
49 Gordon, 422 U.S. at 682 (quoting United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S.
321, 350-51 (1963)).
50 See id. at 684-85.
51 See id. at 685; Harding v. Am. Stock Exch., Inc., 527 F.2d 1366, 1368 (5th Cir.
1976) ("[R]ather than presenting a case of SEC impotence... this case involves
explicit statutory authorization for SEC review of all exchange rules and practices
dealing with rates of commission and resultant SEC continuing activity."); Jacobi v.
Bache & Co., 520 F.2d 1231, 1237 (2d Cir. 1975) (reading Gordon as posing a twopart test: whether the activity fell under the SEC's jurisdiction, and whether the
SEC had actively asserted its authority); see also Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) L.L.C. v.
Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383, 2390 (2007) (discussing the Gordon court's rationale for
finding a conflict between the two laws).
52 Gordon, 422 U.S. at 689; see FLOYD & SULLIVAN, supra note 18, § 3.4.4.3
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Gordon focused not on the pervasiveness 5 3 of the regulatory
scheme but, rather, on the congressional intent to give authority
over the activity to the SEC and the SEC's exercise of its
authority. 54 In finding that the SEC had "actively regulated" the
practice, the Court pointed to the SEC's fifteen-year process of
studying the effects of fixed commission rates, holding hearings,
proposing rules, setting breakpoints for commission rates,
approving increases in those breakpoints, and eventually
prohibiting fixed commission rates, while still retaining the
power to reinstate fixed rates if necessary. 55 The Court reasoned
that this long history of regulation, coupled with the authority
conferred by the Exchange Act and subsequent congressional
approval of SEC rules, showed that Congress intended to confer
56
It
on the SEC the power to regulate commission rates.
concluded that antitrust immunity was therefore necessary to
protect the SEC's power. 57 Here, the Court tinkered with the
Silver necessity standard, by asking not whether the particular
SEC rule was necessary to make the Exchange Act work 58 but,

(discussing that, in Gordon, the Exchange Act clearly contemplated that the SEC
would approve some commission rates, while antitrust laws would condemn any
fixed rates; therefore, the two laws were incompatible); see also Phonetele, Inc. v.
Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 664 F.2d 716, 729 (9th Cir. 1981).
53 See Gordon, 422 U.S. at 688-89; see also Jacobi, 520 F.2d at 1238 (holding
that, although the Exchange Act is not sufficiently pervasive to grant blanket
antitrust immunity, "particular instances of exchange self-regulation which fall
within the scope and purposes of the Securities Exchange Act may be regarded as
justified in answer to the assertion of an antitrust claim"); cf. Otter Tail Power Co. v.
United States, 410 U.S. 366, 373-75 (1973) (holding that antitrust immunity is
appropriate in the presence of a pervasive regulatory scheme).
54 See, e.g., Kern, supra note 12, at 1320. Gordon, however, "spawned additional
ambiguities" by failing to articulate the consequences of the SEC's failure to exercise
its authority. Id.
55 See Gordon, 422 U.S. at 670-83.
56 See id. at 691. The fact that sectionl9(b), which permitted the SEC to fix
commission rates, was passed seven years after the Supreme Court held the practice
to be a per se violation of antitrust indicated to the Gordon Court the congressional
intent to impliedly repeal antitrust laws in this context. See Robert Simon Balter &
Christian C. Day, Implied Antitrust Repeals: Principles for Analysis, 86 DICK. L.
REV. 447, 463 (1982).
67 See Gordon, 422 U.S. at 691.
58 See id. at 688. The Gordon court distinguished its ruling from Thill Securities
Corp. v. New York Stock Exchange, 433 F.2d 264 (1970), and declined to follow
Thill's holding that concerned whether the particular rule itself was necessary to
make the Exchange Act work. See Gordon, 422 U.S. at 686-87.
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rather, whether antitrust enforcement would conflict with the
59
overall regulatory scheme.
In the same year as Gordon, the Supreme Court decided
United States v. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc.
("NASD'). 60 In NASD, the government alleged that the NASD,
mutual funds, and broker-dealers had conspired to restrict the
sale and fix the resale price of mutual fund shares, thereby
inhibiting the growth of a secondary market in mutual fund
securities, 6 1 and forcing investors to pay "artificial and noncompetitive" sales loads for mutual fund shares.6 2 Employing
many of the same factors as Gordon,63 the Court found a clear
repugnancy between antitrust laws and the regulatory statute
and granted antitrust immunity. 64 NASD, however, differs from
Gordon because while the SEC had been given authority to
regulate such activities, the SEC had arguably never exercised
that authority, such as by promulgating standards that
permitted the challenged conduct. 65 The Investment Company
Act of 1940 permitted mutual fund companies to impose
restrictions on the sales of their shares, as long as these
66
limitations conformed to the rules promulgated by the SEC.

59 See Gordon, 422 U.S. at 688 ("[We are concerned with whether antitrust

immunity, as a matter of law, must be implied in order to permit the Exchange Act
to function as envisioned by the Congress."); see, e.g., AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra
243d. Under Gordon, "necessity" may have two meanings: (1) whether
note 12,
antitrust immunity is necessary to make the statute function as a "general
matter;"or (2) whether the specific activity was "necessary to achieve regulatory
goals." The second inquiry is not needed if the first question is satisfied. Id.
60 422 U.S. 694 (1975).
61 Mutual fund shares are purchased by investors from the fund itself or
through a broker for the fund, which is considered a primary market. Investors do
not purchase shares from other investors on a secondary market, such as the New
York Stock Exchange. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Mutual Funds,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/mutfund.htm; see NASD, 422 U.S. at 699-700. An active
secondary market in mutual fund shares existed prior to 1940, and abuses in the
secondary market led to the passage of the Investment Company Act, which was
designed to restrict most secondary market trading. See NASD, 422 U.S. at 709-10.
62 NASD, 422 U.S. at 700; Haddad v. Crosby Corp. (In re Mut. Fund Sales
Antitrust Litig.), 374 F. Supp. 95, 97 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd sub nom. United States v.
NASD, 422 U.S. 694 (1975), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Haddad v.
Crosby Corp., 533 F.2d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1976), and affd without opinion, 578 F.2d
442 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
63 See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383, 2391 (2007).
64 See NASD, 422 U.S. at 719.
65 See id. at 727; AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, at 243d.
66 See NASD, 422 U.S. at 722.
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The SEC, however, had not set any standards. 67 At first glance,
it would seem that the SEC had not exercised its authority. The
Court, however, looked at the role of the SEC prescribed by the
Act: Mutual funds retained the initiative in adopting sales
restrictions in order to combat disruptive trading practices,
subject to oversight by the SEC. 68 The Court held that the SEC's
decision not to impose restrictions was an appropriate exercise of
its authority, considering its role under the Act of providing
69
administrative oversight.
The Court framed the issue of repugnancy as a conflict
between antitrust laws and the authority of the SEC. 70 In other
words, since Congress had charged the SEC with final oversight
authority over mutual fund companies, to permit an antitrust
suit would conflict with the authority granted to the SEC to
approve or disapprove of the companies' practices.7 1 The Court
also pointed to the "pervasive supervisory authority" of the
SEC, 72 and the danger of "inconsistent standards" in the absence
of antitrust immunity. 73 While Gordon was silent as to the
extent to which the SEC must exercise its authority, NASD
indicated that this issue largely depends on the role conferred by
Congress on the SEC concerning a particular activity. The
NASD Court reasoned that Congress had determined that there
should be some restrictions on competition in the mutual fund
industry, and that funds could impose restrictions subject to SEC
approval; 74 it was Congress' clear intent that the SEC have the
67 Id. at 721. Although the SEC had not prescribed any rules, SEC reports had
repeatedly acknowledged "the significant role that private agreements have played
in restricting the growth of a secondary market in mutual-fund shares," and the
SEC had permitted fund-initiated restrictions for over three decades. The Court
noted that the SEC's election not to prescribe its own rules was not an "abdication of
its regulatory responsibilities," but rather a manifestation of "informed
administrative judgment." Id. at 727-28.
68 Id. at 727.
69 Id. at 728.
70 See id. at 729-30.
71 See id.; see also FLOYD & SULLIVAN, supra note 18, at 338-39 (stating that
NASD stands for the proposition that, for implied immunity to apply, the SEC does
not have to approve of the conduct, but it should not exercise its authority to
disapprove it either).
72 NASD, 422 U.S. at 733; see Austin Mun. Secs., Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Secs.
Dealers, Inc., 757 F.2d 676, 695-96 (5th Cir. 1985).
73 See NASD, 422 U.S. at 735.
74 See id. at 726; Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of
Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1237 (1996) ("NASD suggested that the mere fact
that the statute permits private parties to enter anticompetitive agreements is alone
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authority to determine to what extent these restrictions should
be tolerated in order to protect the interests of investors. 75 A
repugnancy existed because of the "pervasive supervisory
authority" 76 granted to the SEC, rather than any affirmative act
or policy by the SEC.
B. Interim Lower Court Decisions
The lower court decisions prior to Billing provide additional
clarity to the line of reasoning established by Silver, Gordon, and
NASD. First, when a regulatory agency has disapproved of an
activity that is also prohibited by antitrust laws, a repugnancy
does not exist, and implied immunity should not be found. When
Congress has granted the SEC some level of autonomy over an
activity, however, a repugnancy may exist, even if the SEC has
not exercised its authority to approve or disapprove of the
activity. In such cases, a repugnancy may exist, even if the
agency currently disapproves of the activity, as long as the
agency could potentially approve of the activity.
The lower court cases immediately following Gordon and
NASD tended to cover the same ground as Gordon: Implied
immunity is appropriate when the activity falls under the SEC's
authority, the SEC has actively regulated that activity, and
immunity is necessary to make the regulatory statute function as
intended. 77 In Austin Municipal Securities,Inc. v. National Ass'n
of Securities Dealers,78 and Harding v. American Stock

sufficient to establish 'clear repugnancy' with the antitrust laws.").
75 See NASD, 422 U.S. at 729; see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-22(f) (West 2008).
76 The Court determined that the SEC held "pervasive supervisory authority"
over the mutual funds since the SEC had the power to determine if a company had
satisfied the requirement of the Investment Company Act of 1940. Furthermore, all
registered companies were required to submit any proposed rule changes to the SEC
for approval, and the SEC had the power to request changes, or order such changes
itself. See NASD, 422 U.S. at 732.
77 See, e.g., Jacobi v. Bache & Co., 520 F.2d 1231, 1237 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding no
implied immunity when the SEC's power to enforce a rule on stock sales revenues
was at "the periphery of its jurisdiction" and the SEC had disclaimed any power to
review).
78 757 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that the pervasive regulatory scheme of
the Maloney Act and the Exchange Acts shielded disciplinary officers of the NASD
from an antitrust action).
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Exchange,79 the Fifth Circuit examined cases factually similar to
NASD and found implied immunity.80
The next group of significant implied immunity cases was
decided by the Second Circuit. Although involving commodities
markets, rather than the securities markets, Strobl v. New York
82
Mercantile Exchange l is an important implied immunity case
and elucidates the clear repugnancy standard. Unlike prior case
law, Strobl involved conduct that was both a per se violation of
antitrust laws and prohibited by the regulatory statute.8 3 The
plaintiff, a speculator in potato futures, alleged that potato
processors had conspired to manipulate the futures prices,
resulting in a loss to the plaintiff.8 4 Since price manipulation
was specifically forbidden by the Commodity Exchange Act
("CEA"), as well as by the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, the
provisions of the CEA did not conflict with antitrust laws.8 5 The
Strobl court maintained that the presence of a regulatory scheme
alone is insufficient to grant immunity; rather, there must be an
actual conflict (not simply an overlap of authority).8 6 Gordon and
Silver "teach that antitrust laws may not apply when such laws
87
would prohibit an action that a regulatory scheme might allow."
In Strobl, price manipulation was expressly prohibited under
section 6(b) of the CEA; this was not a case, such as NASD,
where Congress had granted the agency some degree of
autonomy over the practice and the agency could permit or
prohibit manipulation at its discretion. Strobl indicates that,
unless an agency has been granted pervasive supervisory power
over an activity, agency approval of the challenged conduct is
necessary for a finding of implied immunity, since, otherwise, no
clear repugnancy would exist.
The Second Circuit adopted a line of reasoning more in tune
with NASD88 in Finnegan v. Campeau Corp.,8 9 focusing its
79 527 F.2d 1366 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that the delisting of an investor's stock

by an exchange was "without the ambit" of antitrust laws since delisting was subject
to approval by SEC).
so See Austin, 757 F.2d at 695; Harding,527 F.2d at 1369-70.
81 768 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1985).
82 See Falvey & Kleit, supra note 13, at 152.
83 See Stobl, 768 F.2d at 28; Falvey & Kleit, supra note 13, at 152.
84 Strobl, 768 F.2d at 24.
85 Id. at 27-28.
86Id. at 27.
87 Id.

88 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12,

243e3 (noting that Finnegan follows
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inquiry on the question of the SEC's authority. In Finnegan, the
shareholder of a target company brought an antitrust action,
alleging that the conspiratorial practices of two bidders in a
takeover attempt violated the Sherman Act. 90 The court held
that, since the Williams Act gave the SEC authority to require
disclosure of bidding arrangements and prevent fraudulent
practices, the Act and antitrust laws were in conflict. 9 1 The fact
that the SEC had not exercised that authority did not "reduce the
SEC's supervisory authority. 92 Since the SEC's authority in this
instance primarily consisted of ordering disclosures, however, it
arguably would not necessarily conflict with the SEC's authority
93
to apply both the Williams Act and the Sherman Act.
The Second Circuit continued this interpretation of
repugnancy in Friedman v. Salomon/Smith Barney, Inc.,9 4
finding antitrust immunity based on a conflict of authority, even
when the SEC had studied the activity in question and failed to
exercise its authority to disapprove of the activity. 9 5
In
Friedman,individual investors alleged that defendants, sellers of
stock, restricted investors from "flipping" (selling their purchases
shortly after an initial public offering) as a form of price
stabilization (a restriction not in place for institutional investors)
in violation of the Sherman Act. 96 The court found that since,
under the Exchange Act, price stabilization measures were
permitted subject to SEC approval, Congress had granted the
SEC pervasive oversight authority over the activity. 97 Therefore,
permitting antitrust litigation would conflict with the role given
to the SEC by Congress to have final authority over the
98
challenged conduct.

NASD).
89 915 F.2d 824 (2d

Cir. 1990).

90 Id. at 826.

91 Id. at 829-31.
92

Id. at 831.

93

William T. Reid IV, Comment, Implied Repeal of the Sherman Act Via the

Williams Act: Finnegan v. Campeau Corp., 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 965, 974-76 (1991)
("Since SEC intervention into conspiratorial bidding arrangements is beyond any
procedural powers vested in the SEC by section 14(e), the Sherman Act can coexist
with the Williams Act.").
94 313 F.3d 796 (2d Cir. 2002).
95 See id. at 800-01; AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12,
243e3.
96 Friedman,313 F.3d at 797-98.
97 See id. at 802.
98 See id. at 800-01.
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Although not explicitly overturning Strobl, In re Stock
Exchanges Options Antitrust Litigation ("Stock Options")99
diverged significantly from Strobl's previous emphasis on
"conflicts." 10 0 In Stock Options, the purchasers of equity options
alleged that several exchanges had conspired to restrict the
listing and trading of particular options to one exchange at a
time, rather than multiple listings, thereby restraining trade in
violation of the Sherman Act. 10 1 Although the SEC's view on
whether multiple listings should be permitted had changed often
in the past, 10 2 at the time of Stock Options, both the SEC and the
Sherman Act prohibited restrictions on multiple listings. 10 3 The
plaintiff contended that implied repeal was not necessary since
there was no conflict between the two laws. 0 4 Nevertheless, the
court found that implied immunity does not depend on a conflict
between the views of the agency and antitrust laws; rather, "it

turns on whether the antitrust laws conflict with an overall
regulatory scheme that empowers the agency to allow conduct
that the antitrust laws would prohibit."1 05 Section 9(b) of the
Exchange Act made it unlawful for any person to engage in
options transactions "in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors."'0 6
Congress had thus granted the SEC broad
supervisory power to regulate options trading.10 7 The court saw
no way to reconcile the authority of the SEC-which could
99 Miller v. Am. Stock Exch., Inc. (In re Stock Exchs. Options Trading Antitrust
Litig.), 317 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003).
100 See Falvey & Kleit, supra note 13, at 153-54.
101 Stock Options, 317 F.3d at 138.

104

Id. at 143.
Id. at 142 (citing U.S. Department of Justice Amicus Curiae Brief at 12-13).
Id. at 149.

105

Id.

102
103

15 U.S.C. § 78i(b) (2000). Although section 9(b) is not discussed in Stock
Options, it is analyzed in the underlying district court decision, which Stock Options
frequently references. See In re Stock Exchs. Options Trading Antitrust Litig., No.
1283, 2001 WL 128325, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2001), affd sub nom. Miller v. Am.
Stock Exch., Inc. (In re Stock Exchs. Options Trading Antitrust Litig.), 317 F.3d 134
(2d Cir. 2003).
107 See In re Stock Options, 2001 WL 128325, at *2. The district court decision
noted that, when Congress amended the Exchange Act in 1975, the SEC's power
over options trading increased. The exchanges were required to submit all rule
changes to the SEC for approval, and the SEC was authorized to alter exchange
rules. Id. This is similar to the "pervasive supervisory" authority found in NASD.
See supra note 76.
106
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potentially permit exclusivity agreements-with antitrust
laws.1 08 The court reached this decision despite an amicus brief
from the SEC arguing against granting immunity, 109 prompting
some commentators to note that Stock Options "does not even
allow a regulatory agency to deny authority." 110 The opinion in
Stock Options equated the traditional inquiry of whether there is
a clear repugnancy, thus making implied immunity necessary to
make the Exchange Act work, with the inquiry of whether
antitrust laws conflict with an overall regulatory scheme that
grants the authority to a regulatory agency to permit the
challenged conduct."'

II.

CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES (USA) LLC v. BILLING

In Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing,112 the
Supreme Court again addressed the issue of antitrust immunity
in the securities industry and held, in a 7-1 decision, 1 3 in favor of
implied immunity. Although Billing purported to be solidly
based on the Court's earlier decisions in Silver, Gordon, and
NASD, something had clearly changed in the Court's antitrust
immunity analysis. While prior cases focused on questions of
authority over the challenged conduct, the bulk of Billing's
analysis concerned the potential results of antitrust litigation.
This new test, initially proposed by Trinko and affirmed by
Billing, recasts "clear repugnancy" as a question of outcomes,
rather than any inherent differences in policy or authority. In
Billing, conflict is not premised on a difference of opinion
between antitrust laws and the regulatory agency, or even a
108 In re Stock Exchs. Options, 317 F.3d. at 150.
109 See id. at 149. The SEC maintained that:
[T]his is an unusual case, in which the Commission has addressed the
precise conduct at issue and has decided to prohibit it ....It does not

present a situation where, in our view, the antitrust laws are impliedly
repealed, such as where the securities laws authorize the conduct or the
Commission has approved or permitted it.
Id. at 142 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting SEC Amicus Curiae Brief at
2-3).
110 Falvey & Kleit, supra note 13, at 155.
111Babbin et al., supra note 23, at 1234-35.
112 127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007).
113 Justice Thomas dissented arguing that both the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act have broad saving clauses that preserved the right to seek remedies
under other laws. Id. at 2399. Justice Kennedy recused himself since his son was a
managing director of Credit Suisse Securities. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Back
Underwriters on New Issues, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2007, at C1.
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conflict of authority between the two laws. Rather, the Court's
finding of a conflict is largely based on the possibility of differing
results from lower courts if antitrust lawsuits are permitted. At
the heart of this new approach is the underlying policy of limiting
securities and antitrust lawsuits that could be numerous and
In fashioning a new standard for antitrust
unmeritorious.
14
immunity, Billing has conferred such broad-scale immunity
from antitrust suits that it begs the question when, if ever,
immunity would be inappropriatein the securities industry.
In Billing, a group of sixty investors filed two antitrust class
action suits against ten leading investment banks.1 1 5 During the
stock market bubble of the late 1990s, the banks had served as
underwriters, forming syndicates 11 6 to execute the IPOs of
hundreds of technology-related companies.11 7 The investors
alleged that the banks violated antitrust laws by conspiring not
to sell shares of the new IPOs unless the buyers agreed: (1) to
pay excessively high sales commissions; (2) to purchase other,
less desirable securities in a practice known as "tying";1 1 8 and
(3) to buy additional shares of the IPO at escalating prices in a
practice known as "laddering."1 19 The investors alleged that the
114 Brian A. Howie, Aimed at Antitrust, LEGAL TIMES (Wash., D.C.), July 16,
2007, at 60.
115 Billing, 127 S.Ct. at 2388.
116 Two or more investment banks often form a syndicate to underwrite IPOs.
The banks assess the market value and price the shares of the new IPO. The banks
buy the shares from the company at an agreed price and resell the shares to
investors at full price. See Wesley R. Powell & Matthew Freimuth, Antitrust
Disputes Nixed: SEC Governs IPO Underwritings, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 23, 2007, at 4.
"Such syndicate activity is a commonplace feature of IPOs and clearly allowed (even
encouraged) under securities law." Stephen J. Hill, Supreme Court Decision

Precludes Overlap Between Antitrust and Securities Laws, 15 ANDREWS ANTITRUST
LITIG. REP. 3 (2007).
117 Powell & Freimuth, supra note 116, at 4; see also Howie, supra note 114, at
60; Roberta S. Karmel, Underwriters' Victory in Supreme Court Case, N.Y.L.J., Aug.
16, 2007, at 3.
118 Billing, 127 S.Ct. at 2389; Howie, supra note 114, at 60; Karmel, supra note
117, at 3. Certain tie-in arrangements require customers to purchase shares of the
same security after the IPO, creating an artificial demand for the stock. This
practice is manipulative since its purpose is to push the price of the stock higher
following the IPO. See Billing v. Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd., 426 F.3d 130, 142
(2d Cir. 2005), rev'd sub nom. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct
2383 (2007).
119 Billing, 127 S.Ct. at 2389. Laddering agreements, a variation on "tying," are
another form of price manipulation of a stock in which the pre-arranged purchase of
shares at escalating prices following the IPO stimulates the demand for the stock,
helping the price rise to a premium. See Billing, 426 F.3d at 142-43.
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purpose of this conspiracy was: (1) to increase the price of shares
that purchasers paid following the IPO well above what the price
would have been in a competitive market; and (2) to create an
artificial demand for the shares, leading to increased
120
commissions and fees for the banks.
The banks moved to dismiss the claim, arguing that federal
securities laws impliedly repealed antitrust laws for the
challenged conduct. 121 The district court found immunity and
dismissed the complaint, 122 while the Second Circuit reversed
23
and reinstated the complaint.'
In addressing the issue of implied immunity, the Supreme
24
Court drew heavily on the Silver-Gordon-NASD line of cases,'
reiterating the old standards that courts may imply a repeal of
antitrust laws "only to the minimum extent necessary" and only
if a "plain repugnancy" exists between the antitrust laws and
From the Silver-Gordon-NASD
regulatory provisions. 25
triumvirate, the Court distilled four critical factors for finding a
''clear repugnancy" between antitrust and securities laws:
(1) the existence of regulatory authority under the securities
law to supervise the activities in question; (2) evidence that the
responsible regulatory entities exercise that authority; ... (3) a
resulting risk that the securities and antitrust laws, if
both applicable, would produce conflicting guidance,
requirements, duties, privileges, or standards of conduct[;
and] ... (4) ... [whether] the possible conflict affected practices
that lie squarely within an area of financial market activity that
26
the securities law seeks to regulate.
27
The Court easily dispatched three of these requirements.1
First, the Court found that the activity in question-investment

120 In

re Initial Pub. Offering Antitrust Litig., 287 F. Supp. 2d 497, 500

(S.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated sub nom. Billing v. Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd., 426
F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2005), rev'd sub nom. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127
S. Ct 2383 (2007).

Billing, 127 S. Ct. at 2389.
See IPOAntitrust Litig., 287 F. Supp. 2d at 524-25.
See Billing, 426 F.3d at 170.
See Billing, 127 S. Ct. at 2389-92; Karmel, supra note 117, at 3, 7; Powell &
Freimuth, supra note 116, at 4, 7 (stating that the Billing Court "anchored" its
opinion on Silver-Gordon-NASD).
125 See Billing, 127 S. Ct. at 2390.
126 Id. at 2392.
127 See Powell & Freimuth, supra note 116, at 7 ("In short order, the Court
found three of these factors present in Billing.").
121
122
123
124
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banks acting jointly to underwrite new securities-is "central to
the proper functioning of well-regulated capital markets." 128 The
Court also found that the SEC had broad authority to regulate
the banks' conduct 129 and had continuously exercised that

authority. 130
The Billing Court devoted most of its analysis to the third
issue: whether the concurrent application of both securities and
antitrust laws would produce conflicting standards for the
banks. 131 The SEC had long considered tying and laddering
arrangements to be "fraudulent and manipulative."
Such
practices had always been actionable under section 17(a) of the
Securities Act and section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 of the Exchange
Act,' 32 and the SEC had brought actions against underwriters
128 In
analyzing the fourth factor, the Court looked beyond whether the activity
was regulated by the SEC to the importance of the activity to the securities markets.
The Court noted that the IPO process is valuable to the market since it "supports
new firms that seek to raise capital; it helps to spread ownership of those firms
broadly among investors; it directs capital flows in ways that better correspond to
the public's demand for goods and services." See Billing, 127 S.Ct. at 2392; see also
Brief of Plaintiff, In re Shortsale Antitrust Litig., No. 06 Civ. 2859, (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
21, 2007), 2007 WL 2959914 (interpreting the fourth factor from Billing as whether
the activity "impact[s] the proper functioning of the securities markets").
129 Billing, 127 S. Ct. at 2392-93 ("Indeed, the SEC possesses considerable
power to forbid, permit, encourage, discourage, tolerate, limit, and otherwise
regulate virtually every aspect of the practices in which underwriters engage."). The
Court pointed specifically to
15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(3), 77j, 77z-2 (granting the SEC power to regulate the
process of book-building, solicitations of "indications of interest,"
and communications between underwriting participants and their
customers...); § 78o(c)(2)(D) (granting the SEC power to define and
prevent through rules and regulations acts and practices that are
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative); §§ 78i(a)(6) (similar); § 78j(b)
(similar).
Id. at 2393.
130 Id.
131 See id.
at 2392-93; Karmel, supra note 117, at 7 ("The only issue, to
seriously examine, therefore, was incompatibility."); Powell & Freimuth, supra note
116, at 7.
132 Billing v. Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd., 426 F.3d 130, 142 (2d Cir. 2005),
rev'd sub nom. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S.Ct. 2383 (2007); see
15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a), § 78j(b) (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007). These provisions of
the Securities Act and the Exchange Act are part of the general anti-fraud and antimanipulation provisions of the federal securities laws. See, e.g., Anti-Manipulation
Rules Concerning Securities Offerings, 69 Fed. Reg. 75,774, 75,774 (Dec. 17, 2004).
The SEC had proposed a rule expressly prohibiting tying arrangements in 1974. It
withdrew the rule since tying was already prohibited by the "'existing anti-fraud
and anti-manipulation provisions of the federal securities laws.'" Billing, 426 F.3d
at 142 n.10 (quoting Withdrawal of Proposed Rules Under the Securities Exchange
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who had engaged in tying and laddering agreements. 133
Furthermore, the SEC had extensively reviewed tying and
laddering agreements and had continuously exercised its
authority by proposing rules and issuing statements concerning
such agreements.13 4 The investors argued that, since the SEC
and the antitrust laws both prohibited such anticompetitive
conduct, there could be no "conflict" or "incompatibility" between
35
the two laws.'
The Court, however, rejected this argument, holding that
even though the SEC had disapproved of the banks' conductand, arguendo, would continue to disapprove of it-"securities
law and antitrust law are clearly incompatible."'' 36 This decision
37
was largely premised on the following policy considerations:
(1) the difficulty of lower courts in determining permissible from
impermissible behavior, and the danger of inconsistent decisions;
(2) that the benefits of any antitrust enforcement in addition to
SEC regulation would be slight; and (3) that the costs of antitrust
litigation would be significant. 38 First, to permit antitrust
actions in the immediate case would present a "legal linedrawing problem"'139 since lower courts lack the requisite
expertise to determine which syndicate practices are permitted
and which are forbidden. 40 The Court held that the SEC, with
its superior expertise, is in a better position to distinguish what
Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 26,182 (Oct. 14, 1988), 53 Fed. Reg. 41,206,
41,207 (Oct. 20, 1988)). The SEC adopted "Regulation M" (17 C.F.R. §§ 242.100-05)
in 1996 to prevent price manipulation of securities. Included in the SEC's
interpretation of prohibited activities under Regulation M are tying and laddering
agreements. In re Initial Pub. Offering Antitrust Litig., 287 F. Supp. 2d 497, 515
(S.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated sub nom. Billing v. Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd., 426
F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2005), rev'd sub nom. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127
S. Ct. 2383 (2007).
133Billing, 127 S.Ct. at 2393.
134See Billing, 426 F.3d at 142-43, 170; IPO Antitrust Litig., 287 F. Supp. 2d at
514-15. As an example of the SEC exercising its authority in this area, the Billing
Court mentioned that the SEC has defined in detail "what underwriters may and
may not do and say during their road shows." Billing, 127 S. Ct. at 2393.
135Billing, 127 S.Ct. at 2394.
136Id.
137See Karmel, supra note 117, at 7 ("In finding such incompatibility, the Court

exhibited a policy animus to private antitrust actions in the securities area.").
13i Billing, 127 S.Ct. at 2394-97; Powell & Freimuth, supra note 116, at 7.
139Billing, 127 S.Ct. at 2394.
140 Id. at 2386; see also Howie, supra note 114, at 61 ("[Tjhe Court's decision
amounts to a troubling no-confidence vote in the lower federal courts, at least for
complex antitrust cases.").
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practices should be forbidden, rhetorically asking, "[a]nd who but
the SEC itself could do so with confidence?" 141 The Court also
maintained that permitting complex antitrust lawsuits could
result in numerous, inconsistent results from non-expert judges
and juries 142 and that, in this context, mistakes by lower courts
were "unusually likely."143 While earlier case law had warned of
the danger of "conflicting standards" from antitrust laws and the
regulatory scheme if antitrust lawsuits were permitted,1 44 the
145
Billing Court moved away from this "bilateral" approach,
holding that permitting suits could produce multiple standards
that could chill the activities of underwriting syndicates with
46
disastrous effects on the market.
This focus on the potential outcome of litigation continues in
the Court's subsequent "costs-benefits" analysis. 47 The Court
held that since the SEC actively regulates and forbids the
activity in question, the benefits of additional enforcement by
antitrust litigation are minimal. 148 The Court's analysis echoes
its earlier decision in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP.149 The Court in Trinko held that
Billing, 127 S. Ct. at 2395.
Id.; see also Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,
540 U.S. 398, 406 (2004). In Trinko, an antitrust case concerning the
telecommunications industry, the Court noted that the regulatory scheme
established by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was a "good candidate" for
implied immunity, in order to "avoid the real possibility of judgments conflicting
with the agency's regulatory scheme 'that might be voiced by courts exercising
jurisdiction under antitrust laws.'" Id. (quoting United States v. NASD, 422 U.S.
694, 734 (1975)). This language from Trinko, however, has been categorized as dicta
since Trinko was not an implied immunity case, as the Act contained a saving
clause. See Falvey & Kleit, supra note 13, at 154-55.
143 Billing, 127 S. Ct. at 2396.
144 See NASD, 422 U.S. at 734 (holding that the Court has found implied
immunity to assure that the regulatory agency could carry out its responsibilities
"free from the disruption of conflicting judgments that might be voiced by courts
exercising jurisdiction under the antitrust laws"); Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc.,
422 U.S. 659, 689 (1975).
145 See Hovenkamp, Antitrust Violations, supra note 6, at 629 ("[T]he problem of
inconsistent outcomes is not simply bilateral. Once regulation of an industry is
entrusted to jury trials, the outcomes of antitrust proceedings will be inconsistent
with one another as well.").
146 Billing, 127 S. Ct. at 2396.
141

142

147
148

Id.
Id.

149 540 U.S. 398 (2004). Trinko involved an antitrust challenge and the
Telecommunications Act of 1996. The Act imposes upon an incumbent local
exchange carrier ("LEC") the obligation to share its telephone network with
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when there is a regulatory structure that is "designed to deter
and remedy anticompetitive harm," the additional benefit
provided by antitrust enforcement "will tend to be small." 15 0
Such a regulatory scheme, however, must perform an "antitrust
function" in order
to render
additional
enforcement
unnecessary. 151
III. THE PROPER STANDARD FOR "CLEAR REPUGNANCY"
A.

The Billing Standard
The Billing Court's reading of the third factor, that securities
and antitrust law are incompatible due to the possibility of
mistakes by lower courts, created a new, problematic standard
for determining that a "clear repugnancy" exists. In evaluating a
repugnancy, courts have generally been bound by the Silver
necessity standard 152 and the principle that courts must try to
reconcile the operation of "two statutory schemes whenever, and
to the greatest extent, possible." 153 Also pertinent to this
analysis is whether Congress, by creating this regulatory scheme,
intended to entrust antitrust enforcement exclusively to the
agency. 154 Billing, however, departs from some of the most basic
and long-held tenets of antitrust immunity analysis to create a
new standard for determining that there is a conflict between the
two bodies of law.
The other factors employed by Billing to determine "clear
repugnancy" rest on more solid precedent and provide a useful

competitors. Verizon was the incumbent LEC for New York State and had signed an
agreement to make its networks available to rivals, such as AT&T. The respondent,
an AT&T customer, alleged that Verizon had filled rivals" orders on a discriminatory
basis as part of an anticompetitive scheme in violation of the Sherman Act. Id. at
402-05.
150 Id. at 412.

151See Billing, 127 S.Ct. at 2390 (quoting Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S.
341, 358 (1963), superseded by statute, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78c(f), 78w(a)(2) (West 2006));
Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. at 412; discussion infra Part III.A.
152 See, e.g., United States v. NASD, 422 U.S. 694, 739 (1975) (White, J.,
dissenting); Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 683 (1975); Strobl v. N.Y.
Mercantile Exch., 768 F.2d 22, 26 (2d Cir. 1985).
153 Am. Agric. Movement, Inc. v. Bd. of Trade, 977 F.2d 1147, 1158 (7th Cir.
1992); see, e.g., Gordon, 422 U.S. at 683.
154 FLOYD & SULLIVAN, supra note 18, § 3.4.1; see Nat'l Gerimedical Hosp. &
Gerontology Ctr. v. Blue Cross of Kan. City, 452 U.S. 378, 389 (1981); Am. Agric.
Movement, 977 F.2d at 1158; In re Wheat Rail Freight Rate Antitrust Litig., 759
F.2d 1305, 1312 (7th Cir. 1985).
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starting point for clarifying implied immunity principles. First,
the Court held that the activity in question must fall under the
authority of the SEC for a clear repugnancy to exist. 155 The
Court required more than simply the presence of a pervasive
regulatory scheme. 156
It also required that Congress have
intended for the conduct to fall under the agency's jurisdiction. 157
It was this factor that was determinative in denying immunity in
Silver and in granting immunity in Gordon.158
Second, the regulatory agency must have "exercised" that
authority.159 An agency's exercise of authority, however, is only
truly effective when it performs an "antitrust function" by taking
competitive considerations into account when creating or
enforcing its policies. 160 For example, in Silver, the Court found
that there was nothing in the regulatory scheme that performed
the antitrust function since the SEC did not ensure that the
exchanges would not apply their rules in a way that would
unnecessarily restrict competition.1 61 The rationale for requiring
the "antitrust function" is that, by considering antitrust concerns,
the agency "leaves open a forum for antitrust policy" when there

155

Billing, 127 S. Ct. at 2392. But cf. Nat7 Gerimedical, 452 U.S. at 389 ("Intent

to repeal the antitrust laws is much clearer when a regulatory agency has been
empowered to authorize or require the type of conduct under antitrust challenge.");
FLOYD & SULLIVAN, supra note 18, § 3.4.4.1 ("The existence of regulatory
jurisdiction over the conduct at issue does not necessarily imply antitrust
immunity....").
156 Gordon, 422 U.S. at 688-89.
157 See id. at 683-84.
158 See, e.g., id. at 685; Falvey & Kleit, supra note 13, at 150 ("Although there
was a comprehensive regulatory framework in place, there was no direct securities
regulation addressing the telephone issue found in Silver. Accordingly, the Court
denied the defense of Implied Immunity."); Steven Semeraro, The Antitrust-Telecom
Connection, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555, 569 (2003) (noting that Silver rejected the
SEC's "general power to adopt rules" as sufficient grounds for implied immunity).
159 See, e.g., Billing, 127 S. Ct. at 2393.
160 See id. at 2396; Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko,
LLP, 540 U.S.398, 412 (2004) (noting that "the additional benefit to competition
provided by antitrust enforcement will tend to be small" where other laws and
regulatory structures are "designed to deter and remedy anticompetitive harm");
Nat'l Gerimedical, 452 U.S. at 390; United States v. NASD, 422 U.S. 694, 740-41
(1975) (White, J., dissenting); United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 351
(1963); Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 358 (1963), superseded by statute,
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78c(f), 78w(a)(2) (West 2006); United States v. Radio Corp. of Am.,
358 U.S. 334, 343 (1959).
161 Silver, 373 U.S. at 358-59; see AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, at
243d.
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is a finding of implied immunity by a court. 162 Furthermore, if
Congress intended that competitive factors play a role in an
agency decisions, but the role is circumscribed by the goals of the
163
regulatory scheme, then implied immunity is justified.
Arguably, the "antitrust function" should not be read as
synonymous with the standards of an antitrust court since this
could easily defeat a regulatory scheme that must take factors in
addition to competition into account.1 64 The Court, however, has
held that a regulatory agency must apply standards "similar to
If an agency is
standards developed in antitrust law." 165
empowered only to consider the "public interest" and
"convenience" in its decision-making, for example, rather than
competitive considerations, this standard may be insufficient to
support a finding of implied immunity. 166 The Court has not
prescribed any specific standards for the agency's "antitrust
function," but the Court's decisions seem to indicate that an
agency at least must take antitrust considerations into account,
and that these concerns must be given sufficient weight. 167 In
Billing, the Court determined that the antitrust function was
satisfied because, when the SEC is engaged in rulemaking, it
must consider "'whether the action will promote efficiency,
competition, and capital formation' "168 and "'the impact any
such rule or regulation would have on competition.' "169
It is not clear, though, how much of an exercise of authority
by the agency is required. In Gordon, the SEC's regulation of
fixed commission rates had been active-the SEC had studied
1 70
the practice and required major changes from the Exchange.
In Billing, the Court noted that the SEC had prescribed specific
162 See Parker C. Folse, III, Antitrust and Regulated Industries:A Critique and
Proposal for Reform of the Implied Immunity Doctrine, 57 TEx. L. REV. 751, 779

(1979).

Id.
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
See James F. Ponsoldt, Immunity Doctrine, Efficiency Promotion, and the
Applicability of Federal Antitrust Law to State-Approved HospitalAcquisitions, 12 J.
163

164
165

CORP. L. 37, 53 (1986).
166 See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 373 (1973); United
States v. Radio Corp. of Am., 358 U.S. 334, 343-44, 350 n.18 (1959).
167 See Ponsoldt, supra note'165, at 54 (discussing United States v. Phila. Nat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963)).
168 Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383, 2396 (2007)
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2000)).
169 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C.A. § 78w(a)(2) (West 2006)).
170 See Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 690-91 (1975).
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rules for underwriters and brought actions against underwriters
who violated those rules. 171 The Trinko Court also considered
how well the regulatory scheme was functioning 172 and pointed to
the fact that the FCC had imposed disciplinary measures and
regulations for the challenged conduct.173
When Congress has granted the SEC pervasive supervisory
authority over the challenged conduct, affirmative action by the
SEC is not necessary for a repugnancy to exist. In cases such as
NASD and Friedman, federal securities laws granted the SEC
pervasive supervisory power over the challenged conduct, such
that the conduct could be permitted subject to SEC approval. 174
When Congress has vested the SEC with a certain level of
autonomy, an antitrust suit may offend the authority granted to
the SEC. 175 Therefore, a repugnancy may still exist even if the
SEC has not taken affirmative action. The Second Circuit's
decision in Stock Options clarifies this principle further. In Stock
Options, even though the SEC disapproved of options trading on
multiple exchanges, it retained the power to make rules
permitting the practice. Stock Options illustrates that, in an
instance of pervasive supervisory power, the SEC's current policy
or action is not determinative, rather the authority granted to
the SEC creates a repugnancy.176
In light of these cases, the more appropriate requirement for
cases such as Billing is that the agency must have "actively
regulated" the activity by "scrutiniz[ing] and approv[ing]" the
activity. 177
Antitrust immunity is inappropriate when an
See Billing, 127 S. Ct. at 2393.
See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, 243g.
See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 413 (2004).
174 See Billing v. Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd., 426 F.3d 130, 171 (2d Cir.
2005), rev'd sub nom. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383
(2007).
175 See id. at 160-61; see also Folse, supra note 162, at 788 (arguing that, in
certain circumstances in which autonomy has been conferred on a regulatory agency,
an antitrust suit may upset that autonomy).
176 See Miller v. Am. Stock Exch., Inc. (In re Stock Exchs. Options Trading
Antitrust Litig.), 317 F.3d 134, 149 (2d Cir. 2003).
177 Am. Agric. Movement, Inc. v. Bd. of Trade, 977 F.2d 1147, 1158-59 (7th Cir.
1992); see Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 689 (1975); see also
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, $ 243a2. When an agency has authority over
a practice and has exercised that authority "with some thoroughness," antitrust laws
may be "completely ousted." Id. Courts, however, have also found implied immunity
when there is unexercised administrative power to control conduct, if agency
171
172
173
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agency's approval is not manifested by affirmative action but by
mere "acquiescence, or the failure to take action." 178 In Billing,
the SEC had the authority to regulate the underwriting
process 179 but did not have broad oversight authority; therefore,
it was appropriate for the Court to point to examples of the SEC's
"active" regulation. 180
B. Agency Approval of the Activity Is Necessary for a Findingof
Clear Repugnancy
Traditionally, a "repugnancy" between antitrust laws and a
regulatory statute has been understood to exist in those
instances when an agency has reviewed the activity and
approved it.181 The majority of implied immunity cases have
concerned facts in keeping with this definition; that is, a
repugnancy existed when the regulatory agency had approved of
182
conduct that would otherwise be prohibited by antitrust laws.
Billing is factually distinct from these prior cases, in that both
the SEC and the antitrust laws prohibited tying and laddering,
and a finding of implied immunity under these circumstances
departed from established case law. While courts have stated
that agency supervision of an activity may take many forms, if an
agency has considered a particular activity but has "expressly
denied it approval or expressly declared it inconsistent with
regulatory goals, a claim of implied immunity must be rejected
because of the failure to satisfy the threshold requirement of a

expertise is important for intelligent decision making (e.g. NASD; Friedman; Stock
Options). Id. The issue of whether a regulatory agency must approve of the
challenged conduct in order for antitrust immunity to apply is discussed infra Part
III.B.
178 See Am. Agric. Movement, 977 F.2d at 1163-65 (finding implied immunity
inappropriate when the agency's supervision of the activity was "casual and
modest"); see also Sound, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 631 F.2d 1324, 1330 (8th Cir.
1980) (denying implied immunity when FCC enforcement had been "sluggish");
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Violations, supra note 6, at 629, 632.
179 See Hovenkamp, Antitrust Violations, supra note 6, at 629 ("Most aspects of
the initial public offering process ... are subject to the regulatory supervision of the
SEC.").
180 See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383, 2393 (2007).
181AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, 243e3; see CableAmerica Corp. v.
FTC, 795 F. Supp. 1082, 1092 (N.D. Ala. 1992) (holding that no repugnancy existed
since defendant's conduct had not been approved or authorized by the FTC).
182 See Billing v. Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd., 426 F.3d 130, 169 (2d Cir.
2005), rev'd sub nom. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct 2383 (2007).
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repugnancy between the regulatory and antitrust regimes."1 8 3
Approval of the challenged activity is an essential element for
repugnancy, and courts have denied implied immunity when the
activity was "neither compelled nor approved" by the regulatory
18 4
agency.
When an agency disapproves of an activity, this typically
refutes any claim of implied immunity.1 8 5 For a repugnancy to
exist, application of the two laws must produce "differing
results"' 1 6 and implied immunity is not appropriate, unless the
regulatory agency has "policies that directly contradict antitrust
principles." 18 7 When both laws prohibit the same sort of conduct,
there can be no repugnancy since enforcing one would support
the other. 8 8 This approach can be reconciled with the Second
Circuit cases that placed an emphasis on the authority of the
SEC to regulate the conduct in question, since, in both cases, the
SEC had studied the practice but had not condemned it.189 In
those cases, the SEC still had the "potential" to permit the

183

MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 462 F. Supp. 1072, 1083 (N.D.

Ill. 1978).
184 Nat'l Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Ctr. v. Blue Cross of Kan. City, 452
U.S. 378, 389 (1981); see also Ricci v. Chi. Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 299-300,
306 (1973); Am. Agric. Movement, Inc. v. Bd. of Trade, 977 F.2d 1147, 1158 (7th Cir.
1992) (defining conflict as conduct that would be prohibited under antitrust laws and
justified or required under the regulatory scheme).
185 FLOYD & SULLIVAN, supra note 18, § 3.4.7; see also Ricci, 409 U.S. at 304
(holding that, if the Commodities Exchange Commission was to determine that the
activity was in violation of its rules, "the antitrust action should very likely take its
normal course"); Strobl v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 768 F.2d 22, 28 (2d Cir. 1985); MCI
Commc'ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1105 (7th Cir. 1983);
Phonetele, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 664 F.2d 716, 731-32 (9th Cir. 1981); Ne. Tel.
Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1981); Oahu Gas Serv., Inc. v.
Pac. Res., Inc., 460 F. Supp. 1359, 1377-78 (D. Haw. 1978).
186 Darren Bush, Mission Creep: Antitrust Immunities as Applied to Deregulated
Industries, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 761, 784 (2006) (quoting Balter & Day, supra note 56,
at 465).
187 Falvey & Kleit, supra note 13, at 155.
188 See Sound, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 631 F.2d 1324, 1329-30 (8th Cir.
1980) (indicating there is no repugnancy if allowing an antitrust suit would not
conflict with proper application of another statute); see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 12, 243e3 ("Clearly, no 'repugnancy' exists between a regulatory regime
and antitrust policy where enforcing the latter would support the former.").
189 See Hovenkamp, Antitrust Violations, supra note 6, at 630-31.
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activity in question, 190 as opposed to cases such as Billing, when
the SEC had exercised its authority to condemn the practice.
It seems more difficult to finesse even a potential conflict in
cases when the agency has clearly spoken and is in harmony with
antitrust laws. 191 Billing is distinguishable from prior cases,
since the SEC did not have pervasive supervisory authority over
tying and laddering agreements, making a potential conflict
unlikely. Congress did not explicitly grant the SEC the power to
review such agreements and approve or disapprove of the
agreements at its discretion. Thus, Billing is not a case like
Friedman, which noted that the Exchange Act permits "a little
price manipulation" to further the SEC's goals; 192 rather, the
agreements fell under the SEC's congressionally-mandated duty
to prohibit fraudulent and manipulative practices. 193 Even the
SEC could not envision a potential scenario when it could permit
tying and laddering, which it had deemed to be fraudulent
conduct. 94 Pervasive supervisory authority is more likely to be
present when the SEC has authority over self-regulatory
organizations ("SROs"), 195 since, as was the case in NASD, the
SEC will usually have the power to review, approve, and order
changes in the SRO's rules.1 96 When this is the case, an antitrust
suit could challenge the autonomy granted to the SEC, and a
repugnancy would exist. 197 This was not the nature of the SEC's
authority over the agreements in Billing; the SEC had clearly
and consistently disapproved of tying and laddering agreements
190 See Billing v. Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd., 426 F.3d 130, 162 (2d Cir.
2005), rev'd sub nom. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383
(2007). The Second Circuit held that its precedents in Finnegan, Friedman, and
Stock Options stand for the proposition that a conflict is possible when there is
"potential" for the agency to permit the challenged conduct. Id.
191 See Folse, supra note 162, at 789 ("For example, it is unlikely that an
antitrust suit seeking damages for conduct that has been independently declared
illegal by the agency will substantially affect the exercise of regulatory autonomy
since the agency disapproves of the conduct.").
192 Billing, 426 F.3d at 162 (quoting Friedman v. SalomonlSmith Barney, Inc.,
313 F.3d 796, 800 (2d Cir. 2002)).
193 See id. ("[A]n agency's power to review, if coupled with an obligation to
prohibit particular anticompetitive conduct, will not create conflict.").
194 Id. at 170 ("The [SEC stated] that it is difficult to envision the circumstances
in which conduct similar to that alleged in the complaint might be permitted."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
195 See id. at 171 (holding that SRO's have a "special status" that the defendants
in Billing could not claim).
196

Id.

197

See id.
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and an antitrust action would not conflict with the SEC's
authority.
The district court, in examining the class action suits that
led to Billing, erred in analogizing the case to Stock Options,
maintaining that, since the SEC had general authority over the
underwriting process, there could still be a potential conflict
assuming that at some point in the future, the SEC could permit
tying and laddering. 198 Billing, however, differed from Stock
Options, since the SEC had consistently condemned tying and
laddering under its general duty to prevent fraudulent
conduct.199 The district court's reading cannot be the correct
standard; it would mean that implied immunity would never be
inappropriate since the SEC could always potentially change its
position on an issue. The court's analogy to Stock Options is also
misplaced since, in Stock Options, the SEC had pervasive
supervisory authority over the exchanges concerning their rules
for options trading rather than authority over private business
conduct. 20 0 In cases such as Billing, when both the SEC and the
antitrust laws have prohibited private business conduct, implied
immunity should not be found.
C.

The Costs-Benefits Approach Is Inappropriatefor Implied
Immunity Analysis

The additional "costs-benefits" test for repugnancy
propounded by Trinko and adopted by Billing is problematic,
particularly in cases when securities and antitrust laws are in
agreement.
Trinko holds that when a regulatory agency is
actively regulating the challenged conduct, and there is potential
for error by the lower courts, antitrust suits are not worth the
costs. 20 1 In reaching this conclusion, however, Trinko "did not
rely on any of the established immunity doctrines." 20 2 Instead,
198See In re Initial Pub. Offering Antitrust Litig., 287 F. Supp. 2d 497, 510

(S.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated sub nom. Billing v. Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd., 426
F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2005), rev'd sub nom. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127
S. Ct. 2383 (2007).
199 See, e.g., Billing, 426 F.3d at 141-43.
200 See In re Stock Exchs. Options Trading Antitrust Litig., No. 1283, 2001 WL
128325, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2001), aff'd sub noma. Miller v. Am. Stock Exch., Inc.
(In re Stock Exchs. Options Trading Antitrust Litig.), 317 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003).
201 See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 412 (2004).
202 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Regulatory Enterprise,2004 COLUM.
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Trinko signaled a shift in immunity analysis from a focus on
"authority" to the "outcome" of potential litigation. 20 3 This is
problematic since holding that a well-functioning regulatory
agency alone is sufficient to justify immunity runs perilously
close to the "mere presence of a regulatory scheme" argument
20 4
previously rejected by the Court.
While courts have previously addressed the danger of
"conflicting mandates" in their immunity analysis, this concern is
not truly applicable to cases such as Billing, where both laws are
in harmony. In such a case, the regulatory scheme does not
create the potential for "irreconcilable mandates," since the SEC
could not compel the conduct prohibited by antitrust laws. 205 Of
course, Trinko and Billing are concerned not simply with this
bilateral view, but with the danger of multiple, inconsistent
outcomes from judges and juries. While it may be argued that
permitting antitrust lawsuits would subject the securities
industry to parallel track regulation that could produce
inconsistent outcomes, thus interfering with the SEC's power to
effectively regulate the industry, 20 6 this argument is harder to
maintain when both bodies of law are in harmony. First,
"antitrust laws are not so inflexible as to deny consideration of
government regulation," 20 7 so antitrust courts may adjust their
rules in recognition of government regulation. 208 Thus, the
chances are small that an antitrust court would produce a
divergent outcome when both antitrust laws and the SEC
BUS. L. REV. 335, 354 (2004); see also Ray G. Besing, The Intersection of Sherman
Act Section 2 and the TelecommunicationsAct of 1996: What Should Congress Do?,
13 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 18-19 (2005) (arguing that the Trinko Court
"abandoned settled implied immunity law by failing to rely upon the Court's own
precedents").
203 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12,
243gl.
204 See, e.g., Nat'l Gerimedical Hosp. and Gerontology Ctr. v. Blue Cross of Kan.
City, 452 U.S. 378, 389 (1981) (holding that the mere presence of a regulatory
scheme does not justify a finding of implied immunity "with respect to every action
taken within the industry"); MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d
1081, 1102 (7th Cir. 1983); Phonetele, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 664 F.2d 716, 729
(9th Cir. 1981).
205 See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S.Ct. 2383, 2395-96 (2007);
Billing v. Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd., 426 F.3d 130, 169 (2d Cir. 2005), rev'd sub
nom. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S.Ct 2383 (2007).
206 See Hovenkamp, Antitrust Violations, supra note 6, at 628-30.
207 Mid-Tex. Commc'ns Sys. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 615 F.2d 1372, 1385 (5th Cir.
1980).
208 Billing, 426 F.2d at 166 (quoting AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12,
240c3).
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prohibit the activity. Furthermore, permitting an antitrust suit
would not interfere with the SEC's authority. When the SEC has
already prohibited a practice, application of antitrust laws would
not curtail its power or "renderf nugatory" any provision of the
20 9
securities laws.
The cost-benefit analysis of Trinko and Billing creates a new
standard for repugnancy that is too broad to harmonize with the
rules of prior case law. 210 Most courts have clung to the Silver
standard, which states that immunity may be found only if
necessary to make securities laws work and, even then, only to
the minimum extent necessary. 211 The proper approach is to try
to reconcile "the operation of both statutory schemes with one
212
another rather than holding one completely ousted."
Subsequent courts have interpreted this principle as making
213
findings of implied immunity "rare" rather than the norm.
Implied immunity is dependent on the finding of an "actual
repugnancy" rather than simply a "perceived repugnancy"
between the regulatory statute and antitrust laws. 21 4 In prior
cases, however, an actual conflict or the potential for conflict
meant a conflict between the antitrust laws and the regulatory
scheme, not merely the possibility that a lower court could rule in
way that differed from the opinion of the regulatory agency.
Billing has substituted the possibility of differing lower court
opinions for general antitrust laws in implied immunity analysis
to create a conflict where none truly exists. 21 5 If this reading of
209 Id. at 169; see Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 691 (1975)
("Implied repeal of the antitrust laws is, in fact, necessary to make the Exchange Act
work as intended; failure to imply repeal would render nugatory the legislative
provision for regulatory agency supervision of exchange commission rates.").
210 See Howie, supra note 114, at 61 ("Rather than following the admonition in
Silver to minimize the scope of implied repeal of antitrust law, [Billing] simply
conferred broad-scale immunity."); see also Powell & Freimuth, supra note 116, at 7.
211 See United States v. NASD, 422 U.S. 694, 739 (1975); Gordon, 422 U.S. at
683; Strobl v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 768 F.2d 22, 26 (2d Cir. 1985).
212 Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963), superseded by statute,
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78c(f), 78w(a)(2) (West 2006).
213 Am. Agric. Movement, Inc. v. Bd. of Trade, 977 F.2d 1147, 1158 (7th Cir.
1992); see, e.g., NASD, 422 U.S. at 719-20 ("Implied antitrust immunity is not
favored."); Finnegan v. Campeau Corp., 915 F.2d 824, 828 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding
that implied immunity is not favored and not to be "'casually... allowed'" (quoting
Gordon, 422 U.S. at 682)); Phonetele, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 664 F.2d 716, 726
(9th Cir. 1981) ("[A]ntitrust immunities are to be strictly construed and not lightly
inferred.").
214 Phonetele, 664 F.2d at 732.
215 See Keith Sharfman, Credit Suisse, Regulatory Immunity, and the Shrinking
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"conflict" is the standard, the application of implied antitrust
immunity is limitless. It is no longer the possibility of conflict
between two bodies of law that is the concern, but rather the
possible application of antitrust laws by lower courts that must
be considered. Since it may always be argued that different
courts could apply the law in different ways, implied immunity
would always be appropriate. This is not, however, the standard
of prior case law. Billing has created a new standard that, unlike
the standard espoused by Silver, Gordon, and NASD, confers an
overly-broad right of implied immunity to regulated industries
and drastically limits a party's ability to receive remedies for
anticompetitive conduct.
Under the Billing standard, "repugnancy" does not truly
exist as a requirement for immunity. The Court has replaced
"repugnancy" with incompatibility, or the potential of
inconsistent results from lower courts. In doing so, the Court has
departed from not only the "clear repugnancy" standard, but the
admonitions of the Silver court, the lodestar of antitrust
immunity analysis for over forty years. 216 Although the Billing
Court pays lip service to the Silver necessity standard, this
concern does not truly factor into the Court's analysis. Contrary
to Billing, finding a conflict alone should not be sufficient; there
must be "a determination that repeal of the antitrust laws is
necessary to make the regulatory act work." 217 In Gordon, for
example, immunity was necessary to make the securities laws
function since Congress, in passing the Exchange Act, had
intended for the SEC to determine whether commission rates
were reasonable or not. 218 This is not the case in Billing, where
Scope of Antitrust, ESAPIENCE CENTER FOR COMPETITION POLICY, June 2007, at
3, available at http://www.globalcompetitionpolicy.org/index.php?id=500&action=907
("But Credit Suisse goes further ... by creating the possibility of antitrust immunity
even in cases of potential future incompatibility where an actually conflicting federal
regulatory policy has yet to be clearly (or even at all) articulated.").
216 See J. Thomas Rosch, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remarks at the
Bates White Fourth Annual Antitrust Conference: Has the Pendulum Swung Too
Far? Some Reflections on U.S. and EC Jurisprudence 3 (June 25, 2007) [hereinafter
Rosch Speech] (arguing that Billing disregards the Silver necessity standard),
availableat 2007 WL 2506630 (F.T.C.).
217 Bush, supra note 186, at 784.
218 See Gordon, 422 U.S. at 691; see also Billing v. Credit Suisse First Boston
Ltd., 426 F.3d 130, 169 (2d Cir. 2005), rev'd sub non. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC
v. Billing, 127 S. Ct 2383 (2007). Similarly, in Finnegan, the Second Circuit held
that "using the antitrust laws to forbid joint bidding would conflict with the
Williams Act's instruction that the SEC regulate 'group' bids." Billing, 426 F.3d at
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tying and laddering only fell under the SEC's jurisdiction in a
general way, as part of the SEC's authority to prevent "fraud,
deception, misrepresentation, and manipulation. 219 As such,
immunity is not necessary to permit the proper functioning of
federal securities laws.
If the only real requirement for immunity is simply the
presence of a well-functioning regulatory agency and the
potential for conflict among lower courts, then there would rarely
be an instance when implied immunity would not be appropriate.
Since antitrust cases are often complex, it could be easily argued
that litigation could result in inconsistent results from nonexpert judges and juries. This seems a far cry from the Silver
necessity standard.
The Billing Decision Is Premised on the Court's Policy
Against PrivateSecurities Actions
The elephant in the room for Billing is the Court's
underlying rationale of limiting securities lawsuits. The Court
exhibited both a mistrust of judges and juries, 220 as well as a
hostility towards private securities actions. 221 Billing puts a
particular emphasis on congressional intent to reduce
unmeritorious securities litigation, as evidenced by the
enactment of laws such as the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act (PSLRA); the Court saw a clear need to prevent
plaintiffs from "dress[ing] what is essentially a securities
222
complaint in antitrust clothing" to circumvent these laws.
Billing and Trinko, along with the Court's recent decision in
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 223 are unique in that they take
D.

169.
219 Billing, 426 F.3d at 169.
220

Rosch Speech, supra note 216, at 3; see also Francis J. Facciolo, When

Deference Becomes Abdication: Immunizing Widespread Broker-Dealer Practices

from JudicialReview Through the Possibility of SEC Oversight, 73 MISS. L.J. 1, 2-3
(2003) (noting the hesitancy of courts in adjudicating complex securities regulation
issues and that courts have tended to defer to the SEC to resolve these issues).
221 Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S.Ct. 2383, 2396 (2007); see
also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1966 (2007) (quoting Dura Pharms.,
Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)).
222 Billing, 127 S.Ct. at 2396; see also Memorandum from Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom LLP, Supreme Court Finds Antitrust Immunity in Securities
Regulation Case 2 (June 19, 2007), http://www.skadden.comcontent/Publications/
Publications1273_-0.pdf.
223 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007).
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into account the "costs" of antitrust litigation in evaluating
questions of implied immunity. 2 24 Both Billing and Trinko are
concerned with the danger of antitrust litigation producing
inconsistent (and mistaken) standards that are "'especially
costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are
designed to protect.'"225 Trinko goes one step further, noting
that courts would be ineffective in evaluating antitrust suits of
this nature, which are likely to be "extremely numerous." 226 In
addition to such cases being "highly technical," cases would
generally require continuous supervision on a day-to-day basis to
prevent antitrust violations; due to the highly detailed knowledge
required for such supervision, regulatory agencies could more
227
effectively perform this function.
Indeed, Billing and Trinko are better understood as part of a
series of cases by the Court to limit litigation. 228 In Twombly (a
case not involving implied immunity), the plaintiffs had accused
a telecommunications company and other local exchange carriers
of violating the Sherman Act by engaging in anticompetitive
behavior. 229 The Court dismissed the antitrust action, holding
that the plaintiffs' complaint did not allege enough facts to show
that they could win at trial.23 0 In order to survive a motion for
dismissal, "[flactual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level. '231 The Court's ruling
effectively raised the bar for how much information a plaintiffs
pleadings must show in order to proceed from the pleadings stage
224 Howie, supra note 114, at 61; Rosch Speech, supra note 216, at 3 ("[T]he
Court's recent decisions, reflect a discomfort with the costs and burdens of private
antitrust litigation.").
225 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
414 (2004) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
594 (1986)); see Billing, 127 S. Ct. at 2396; Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite
Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762 (1984).
226 See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 414.
227 See id. at 414-15.
228 See Jess Bravin & Aaron Lucchetti, Justices Harden Wall Street Armor-IPO
Decision Gives Brokers Broad Antitrust Exemption in Latest Hit to Plaintiffs, WALL
ST. J., June 19, 2007, at A3 (noting that Billing is a "milestone" in the Court's
"recent movement to free markets from the cost and complications of plaintiff
lawsuits").
229 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1962-63 (2007).
230 Id. at 1974 ("Because the plaintiffs here have not nudged their claims across
the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.").
231 Id. at 1965.
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to discovery. Twombly's new standard has had clear effects
beyond antitrust cases, 232 with the result that many plaintiffs
may be deprived of their day in court. 233 In reaching its decision,
234
the Court pointed to the costs of discovery in an antitrust suit.
Like Billing, Twombly recognized a need to weed out
unmeritorious lawsuits, "lest a plaintiff with 'a largely
groundless claim' be allowed to 'take up the time of a number of
other people.' "235 This approach comports with a string of recent
Supreme Court cases, such as Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &
Rights, Ltd.,236 Merrill Lynch v. Dabit,237 and Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,238 that have made it more
difficult for plaintiffs to bring private securities actions. 239 On
second glance, the reasoning applied in Billing seems to flow
more out of these policy considerations than traditional antitrust
immunity analysis. The Court spent the bulk of its analysis
232 See Wendy N. Davis, Just the Facts, but More of Them: An Antitrust Ruling
Is Proving To Be a Bigger Deal than Expected, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2007, available at
http://www.abajournal.comlmagazine/just the facts but more-of them.
233 Id.
("For example, cases where plaintiffs tend to find the crucial evidence
during discovery, such as employment discrimination or conspiracy allegations,
might now never make it to trial.").
234 See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1969. Twombly bluntly notes that "antitrust
discovery can be expensive." Id.; see also Davis, supra note 232.
235 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966.
236 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2504-05 (2007) (holding that inferences of defendant's
knowledge of wrongdoing must be as compelling as an opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent).
237 547 U.S. 71, 87 (2006) (holding that the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998 pre-empts state law class actions).
238 544 U.S. 336, 344-45 (2005) (holding that plaintiffs could not establish loss
causation by alleging that a securities price was inflated through
misrepresentation).
239 See Beth Bar, Raising the Bar: Attorneys Tailor Strategy to High Court
Rulings, N.Y.L.J., July 12, 2007, at 5. During the same term as Billing and
Twombly, the Supreme Court also limited a plaintiffs ability to bring an antitrust
action in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2722
(2007), where the Court overruled its 96-year-old decision, Dr. Miles Med. Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), and held that it is not a per se
violation of antitrust laws for a manufacturer to set minimum resale prices. See
Erwin Chemerinsky, Turning Sharply to the Right, 10 GREEN BAG 2d 423, 436-37
(2007); cf. James Langenfeld & Daniel R. Shulman, The Future of U.S. Federal
Antitrust Enforcement: Learningfrom Past and Current Influences, 8 SEDONA CONF.
J. 1, 14 (2007). The authors point to a recent trend in antitrust cases before the
Supreme Court. Since Trinko, government enforcement agencies have sided with
defendants and argued for rulings that would make antitrust enforcement "more
restricted and difficult," and that, in each case, the Court has ruled for the
defendant, "even going beyond the relief sought by the Government." Id.
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propounding the large costs-and small benefits-of litigation
and its potentially negative effects on the market. 240 While these
considerations may be compelling, they are not truly a part of
immunity analysis. Traditionally, the twin purposes of the "clear
repugnancy" standard have been to allow the agency the freedom
to carry out its regulatory mission and to protect the industry
from inconsistent standards. 241 A costs-benefits analysis furthers
neither of these purposes, and the potential costs of litigation
'242
cannot be equated with "repugnancy.
The Court has made it much more difficult for a plaintiff to
seek a remedy from businesses for antitrust violations. 243 After
Billing, almost all securities activity that falls under the SEC's
regulation is immune from antitrust liability, leaving little or no
room for private antitrust actions. 244 The Court assumed that
the presence of SEC regulation would naturally result in less of a
need for antitrust enforcement. 245 Even if the Court is correct in
240 See Adam H. Charnes & James J. Hefferan Jr., Friendly to Corporations,29
NAT'L L.J. 10 (2007) (citing Billing and Twombly as evidence of a more pro-business
direction for the Court). One prominent potential cost of securities litigation is the
possibility of corporate flight to avoid U.S. securities suits. See Paul M. Kaplan, The
Credit Suisse Decision and U.S. Financial Markets, DAILY DEAL , July 31, 2007,
available at http://www.globalcompetitionpolicy.org/index.php?&id=515&action=907
(arguing that Billing, by limiting antitrust liability for the underwriting process,
prevented the flight of capital from the U.S. to other financial markets, such as
London); Jonathan C. Dickey, Current Trends in Federal Securities Litigation, in
SECURITIES LITIGATION & ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 2007, 339, 358 (2007), available
at 1620 PLI/CORP 339 (Westlaw) (discussing the Paulson Committee Report, which
noted that, as securities action settlements increase "so too do the incentives for
companies to try to evade private litigation under the U.S. securities laws by simply
choosing to sell their shares elsewhere"). This concern was addressed directly by the
Court in Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., No. 06-43, 2008
U.S. LEXIS 1091 (Jan. 15, 2008). The Court noted that, if scheme liability were
permitted, "[o]verseas firms with no other exposure to our securities laws could be
deterred from doing business here .... This, in turn, may raise the cost of being a
publicly traded company under our law and shift securities offerings away from
domestic capital markets." Id. at *25.
241 Phonetele, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 664 F.2d 716, 732 (9th Cir. 1981).
242 See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383, 2398 (2007)
(Stevens, J., concurring) ("I would not suggest... that either the burdens of
antitrust litigation or the risk 'that antitrust courts are likely to make unusually
serious mistakes'. . . should play any role in the analysis of the question of law
presented in a case such as this." (quoting majority opinion)).
243 Chemerinsky, supra note 239, at 436.
244 Hill, supra note 116 ("After Billings, [sic] virtually any activity subject to
Securities and Exchange Commission regulation is likely immune from the antitrust
laws.").
245

Id.

1152

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:1115

painting Billing's antitrust claim as simply a "dressed up"
securities claim, the Court does not consider the effect of its
decision on traditional antitrust claims. While Congress has
restricted plaintiffs' ability to bring securities actions in order to
prevent frivolous suits, there is no similar legislation for
antitrust suits. 246 Although Billing's policy decision is drawn
from securities legislation, its effects will be keenly felt in other
areas of law. Indeed, that may be the most pressing problem of
the Billing standard: that the standard could plausibly be
applied to other regulated industries, thus preventing suits
247
against a variety of firms, from airlines to drug manufacturers.
Like Twombly, Billing's crippling effects on a plaintiffs ability to
get to court could reach far beyond antitrust and securities.
This loss is of no small significance. The Supreme Court has
recognized that Congress created treble damages remedies for
antitrust violations to encourage private antitrust suits, since
these private suits provide significant supplement to the limited
resources available to government agencies for enforcing the
antitrust laws. 248 The availability of treble damages encourages
Id.
See Sharfman, supra note 215; see also Tony Mauro, Investment Banks
Granted Broad Antitrust Immunity, N.Y.L.J., June 19, 2007, at 1 ("Justice Breyer's
strong deference to the SEC could mark a new high-water mark for the regulatory
state that could be applied in other contexts, including telecommunications and
environmental law, where it could be argued that regulators have more expertise
than courts."); Memorandum from Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP to the
Clients of Cleary Gottlieb, U.S. Supreme Court Holds Securities Laws Preclude
Antitrust Lawsuits Concerning Initial Public Offering Underwriting Conduct (June
21, 2007) (on file with author) ("Beyond this particular context, the endorsement of
regulation in Credit Suisse could be applied in other contexts where it can be argued
that regulators have more expertise than courts."). But cf. Axcan Scandipharm Inc.
v. Ethex Corp., No. 07-2556, 2007 WL 3095367, at *5 (D. Minn. Oct. 19, 2007). See
generally Bruce H. Schneider, Credit Suisse v. Billing and a Case for Antitrust
Immunity for Mortgage Lenders Subject to FederalRegulation, 124 BANKING L.J. 833
(2007). Axcan alleged that Ethex engaged in unfair competition in violation of the
Lanham Act. The court held that Billing was inapplicable to the Lanham Act, and
even if it was applicable, there was no serious conflict between the FDA's regulation
of the drug market and Axcan's claims. Id. The court's holding was based, in part, on
the fact that its research failed to locate any cases applying Billing to Lanham Act
claims. Id. at *5 n.10. The Billing analysis has already been used by lower courts to
dismiss antitrust claims in the securities industry. See In re Short Sale Antitrust
Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 253, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that "there is clear
incompatibility between the securities laws and antitrust laws within the short sale
context").
248 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979); see Texas Indus., Inc. v.
Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 642 (1981) (explaining that the private action
246

247
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private antitrust litigants to act as "'private attorneys general'"
by bringing actions against anticompetitive behavior that
might otherwise escape the antitrust enforcement efforts
of government agencies. 249 The supervision provided by a
regulatory agency cannot control all of the activities of a
regulated firm, and budgetary constraints may limit its
effectiveness. 250
It is unlikely that the "overworked and
understaffed" SEC would be able to prevent all antitrust
violations within the securities markets. 25 1 In much recent
securities law jurisprudence, courts have often chosen to defer to
the SEC when possible, thus subjecting cases to "minimal judicial
review." 252
Such deference to an agency, however, is only
appropriate when the agency has superior resources or
experience-otherwise, a court is the better vehicle for
adjudication. 253 Furthermore, while a regulatory agency may be
able to provide the equivalent of injunctive relief to aggrieved
parties, the agency cannot provide private damages, and
certainly not treble damages. 254 Thus, the "flexible arsenal of

"supplements federal enforcement and fulfills the objects of the statutory scheme").
249 Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972) (quoting Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31(1969)).
250 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12,
240b2.
251 Cf. Deborah Brewster, Rules to Target Bigger Hedge Funds, FIN. TIMES, Jan.
8, 2004 (arguing that proposed SEC supervision of hedge funds could be ineffective
since "the understaffed SEC might not be able to cope with processing 6,000 fund
registrations"); Frederick P. Gabriel Jr. & David Hoffman, Talk Does Little to Inspire
or Provoke, INVESTMENT NEWS, May 27, 2002, at 3 (noting that former SEC
Chairman Harvey Pitt was concerned that the SEC's role could be limited due to
understaffing); Anya Schiffrin, A Big Win for the Small Investor-SEC Bans
Selective Information Disclosure-Government Activity, INDUSTRY STANDARD,
Aug. 21, 2000, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_mOHWW/is-32_3/ai
66672333 (noting that, despite the adoption of Regulation FD prohibiting companies
from selectively disclosing information, "only the most egregious offenders are likely
to be punished by an overworked and understaffed SEC"); see also Judith Burns,
Moving the Market: Enforcement Cases by SEC Fall Again; Focus on Late Filers,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2006, at C3 ("Declining enforcement cases comes as the SEC's
budget has been flat for several years and its enforcement-division staff fell 3.5%
from a year earlier. Some experts think the SEC's budget would need to increase
three- or four-fold for it to be sufficiently funded."); David Rogers, Spending Plan
Packs Business Perks-House and Senate Leaders Seek Conservative Support for
$821 Billion Package, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 2003, at A4 (noting that despite a
"growing mutual-fund scandal," the SEC "will lose a third of the $96 million budget
increase it expected").
252 See Facciolo, supra note 220, at 5.
253 See id. at 93.
254 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, 240b2.
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antitrust remedies"-injunction, private damages, and criminal
sanctions-would be lost, replaced by cease and desist orders,
255
rules, and fines, which do not benefit the aggrieved party.
Courts may also be "more skeptical than regulators about
industry claims of efficiency or the social benefits of restraints on
competition," while an agency may be more sympathetic to the
claims of regulated firms, and treat the industry with "undue
deference. '256
According to the regulatory capture thesis,
regulatory agencies are acutely susceptible to the influence of the
very industries they regulate and may unduly favor the interests
of the industry. 257 The SEC is subject to the influence of powerful
interest groups, 258 which could compromise the agency's ability to
effectively address antitrust violations by the industry. 259 The
SEC could be prone to tailor its policies and enforcement to suit
the industry, rather than the best interests of investors. Judicial

255 Id.
240c4; see Falvey & Kleit, supra note 13, at 176 ("[Riegulatory agencies
may not be in a position to grant aggrieved firms effective relief, and courts should
be reluctant to grant parties antitrust immunity.").
256 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, 240c4.
257 Dominique Custos, The Rulemaking Power of Independent Regulatory
Agencies, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 615, 635 (2006); Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory
and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1043 (1997).
258 See Facciolo, supra note 220, at 87-88; Hedge Funds and Independent
Analysts: How Independent Are Their Relationships?: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Gary J. Aguirre, Former
Investigator, Securities and Exchange Commission) ("Powerful interests want the
SEC to stay just the way it is or, better yet, to become even weaker.... Those
interests know how to reward friends and punish perceived enemies. Their tentacles
reach far."); see also Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture,
Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Towards a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
167, 169-70 (1990).
259 See Mutual Fund Trading Abuses: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,109th Cong.
(2005) (statement of Eric W. Zitzewitz, Assistant Professor of Economics, Stanford
Graduate School of Business) ("[T]here has been in some cases a striking similarity
between what the industry has asked for and what the SEC has proposed."). An
example of such deference by the SEC occurred during the recent investigation into
Pequot Capital Management, a large hedge fund. A congressional report noted that
among the SEC's failings in the investigation were delays in the investigation,
disclosure of sensitive information to opposing counsel, and the "special treatment"
of a prominent Wall Street executive that resulted in the postponement of his
interview until after the case's statute of limitations had expired. See 153 CONG.
REC. S10,889 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 2007) (statement of Sen. Grassley); see also Gretchen
Morgenson & Walt Bogdanich, S.E.C. Erred on Pequot, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 4, 2007, at C1.
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review remains necessary to counteract the effects of regulatory
260
capture and more thoroughly combat antitrust violations.
It is arguably Congress' duty, rather than the Court's, to
limit jurisdiction to this extent. Congress has chosen to limit
securities class actions through passage of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act and the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act 261 and has not created similar restrictions for
antitrust suits. 262 Also, as Justice Thomas argued in his dissent
in Billing, the Securities Act and the Exchange Act contain broad
saving clauses, preserving a party's right to other remedies at
law. 263 Both section 16 of the Securities Act and section 28 of the
Exchange Act provide that the rights and remedies offered by the
Act "shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies
that may exist at law or in equity."264 The Court has previously
read these provisions broadly, and emphasized the fact that the
remedies of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act are to be
supplemented by "any and all" additional remedies. 265 Also, the
Trinko Court recognized the Telecommunications Act's saving
clause as "bar[ring] a finding of implied immunity." 266 Given the
plain language of the securities saving clauses and the Court's
See Merrill, supra note 257, at 1052.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78bb(f)(1)(A), 78u-4(b)(2) (2000); see also Edward D.
Cavanagh, Plead a Little: The Defense May Beg for More. But the Supreme Court
Should Not Raise PleadingStandardsfor Antitrust, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 27, 2006, at
50 (arguing that Congress, not the courts, is the appropriate vehicle to implement
Twombly's heightened pleading standards and tort reform in general).
262 See, e.g., Brief of Respondents-Appellees at 19, Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC
v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007) (No. 05-1157), 2007 WL 621841.
263 See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383, 2399 (2007)
(Thomas, J., dissenting). The majority contended that Justice Thomas' reading of the
savings clause was incorrect since the same argument had been raised by the United
States in an amicus brief in Gordon, and the Court rejected the argument. Id. at
2392 (majority opinion). Justice Thomas argued that the issue was not discussed in
Gordon or NASD and that there was no indication that the omission was the product
of "reasoned analysis" rather than "inadvertent oversight." Id. at 2400 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
264 15 U.S.C. § 77p(a), 78bb(a) (2000).
265 See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 383 (1983)
(holding that the availability of an express remedy under the Securities Act did not
preclude a plaintiff from maintaining an action under the Exchange Act).
266 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
406 (2004). The Telecommunications Act has an antitrust-specific savings clause.
Justice Thomas argues that the "mere existence of targeted saving clauses does not
demonstrate ...that antitrust remedies are not included within the 'any and
all' ... remedies" mentioned in the securities savings clauses. Billing, 127 S. Ct. at
2399 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
260
261
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prior readings of saving clauses, the Billing Court dismissed
Justice Thomas' objections all too quickly.
CONCLUSION

Billing signals a significant departure from well-established
principles of antitrust immunity analysis. The Court's overly
broad interpretation of "clear repugnancy" does not consider
whether the activity is essential to permit federal securities laws
to properly function, nor does it require immunity to be extended
only to the minimum extent necessary. When both the SEC and
antitrust laws disapprove of an activity, a clear repugnancy does
not exist and the two laws may be reconciled. By substituting a
costs-benefits analysis for the repugnancy standard, the Court
has made the finding of implied immunity all too easy, in
contradiction of prior cases that hold that grants of implied
immunity should be rare. Billing is more properly understood as
an extension of the Court's policy animus against private
securities actions rather than a continuance of earlier antitrust
immunity analysis. While the Court may have cogent arguments
for limiting litigation, the altering of immunity analysis to
further that goal represents an unprecedented block on a party's
ability to get to court that will be felt far beyond the world of
underwriters and IPOs.

